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Dear Folks
As
you may all know civil suits by employees against their employers is
prohibited in terms of
section 35 of the COID
Act.
Like
indemnities, the deprivation of common law rights is always
controversial. Many have lamented its existence particularly as is the
amount of compensation paid is regarded as hopelessly inadequate. The
fact that the Compensation Commissioner Office is a mess is also a
factor. This prohibition was even considered to be unconstitutional by
the Judge President of the Eastern Cape High Court before being
referred to the Constitutional Court where, ultimately in
Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading,
it was ruled to be within the limits of the Constitution. So
the position is today is in the event of a workplace accident, if
someone is an employee as defined, they cannot utilise their common
law right to sue their employer (the corporate body as well as certain
humans listed in section 56 of the COID Act).
Since various pieces of legislation contain various
definitions of an employee, the question arises as to which definition
is applicable, thus triggering the prohibition on civil suits by
employees against their employers. While the definition as contained
in the COID Act emphasises an express or implied contractual
relationship with a person as well as direct, tacit or in kind
remuneration, the OHS Act definition of an employee includes persons
not necessarily remunerated or with whom a contractual relationship
exists but also persons who work under the direction or supervision of
an employer or any other person.
To further compound matters, section 1 of the OHS Act
excludes a Labour Broker from the definition of an employer but with
reference to the now repealed Labour Relations Act, 1956 (Act No. 28
of 1956). By inference all labour supplied by a Labour Broker will be
employees of the employer and not the Labour Broker. However, the
current Labour Relations Act (LRA Act) in
section 198 makes no
mention of the term 'Labour Broker', using instead the term 'Temporary
Employment Service'. (TES). A Temporary Employment Service is defined
in that Act as an employer and to further complicate matters, should
there be a conflict between the Labour Relations Act and any other
piece of legislation for example the OHS Act, the LRA Act takes
precedence. (Save the Constitution) So where do we stand? In terms of
the LRA Act persons supplied via a TES to employers are the employees
of the TES. The
COID Act still makes
reference to Labour Brokers also defining them as employers in their
own right. In terms of the LRA and COID Acts persons (labour)
supplied to other persons and companies are therefore 'non employees'
of the 'recipient' employer and they – or their dependants for that
matter - enjoy the common law right to sue them if they are injured
in a workplace accident.
The issue was recently addressed in
Rieck v Crown Chickens
(Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry [2005]
an Eastern Cape High Court decision. Subscribers can click on the case
above for the full Law Report. A cashier, who working under the
control of Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd but whose services were 'supplied'
by a Labour Broker was abducted by armed robbers and wounded when
security guards fired shots at the getaway car which contained her and
the robbers. She instituted a civil case against Crown Chickens for
compensation. The latter raised, inter alia, the defense that
she was, as an employee of the company, precluded from instituting
such a claim in terms of section 35 of the COID Act. The court found
that her injury was an occupational accident as defined in the COID
Act and that the security guards who wounded her had acted
unreasonably and therefore negligently. The case also dealt with the
issue of vicarious liability whether, if an employee acts negligently
during the course of his employment and caused someone injury, the
company could be held liable. With reference to the COID Act
definition of an employee it was held that she was an employee of the
Labour Broker and therefore not prohibited from suing Crown Chickens
(Pty) Ltd. Also that Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd was liable through the
negligence of its employees, the security guards who fired on the
getaway cat wounding the cashier. Extract......
'The definition of an employer
contemplates that a person is an employer if he, she or it employs an
employee in terms, obviously, of a contract of service. In order to
ensure that all employees (except those specifically excluded),
receive the protection of the Act, and to eradicate grey areas, the
Legislature has expressly included certain categories of persons in
the definition: because of the rule that the State is not usually
bound by its own statutes, the State is expressly included as an
employer; because of the uncertainty that may be created when an
employee's services are lent or let by an employer to another,
subsection (b) of the definition provides that in such circumstances,
the "permanent" employer, rather than the person to whom the
employee's services are let or lent, remains the employer for purposes
of the Act; and to clarify the position when labour brokers are
involved in providing labour to businesses, subsection (c) of the
definition makes it clear that, irrespective of where the employee's
services are rendered, and who controls the employee's day-to-day
conduct in the workplace, the labour broker remains the employer for
purposes of the Act. This is logical for two reasons: firstly, the
contract of service is entered into by the labour broker and the
employee and there is no contractual nexus between the employee and
the person to whom he or she provides services; secondly, the labour
broker is the employer who pays contributions to the Compensation
Fund, and not the person to whom the services are rendered'.
So there you
have it. The question as to whether persons supplied by Labour Brokers
enjoy the right to sue natural and juristic persons (employers in
which they are placed) has been posed to me at each and every workshop
I have presented. I should be borne in mind, however, that the
decision is not binding on provinces outside the Eastern Cape and,
although improbable, may even be appealed.
Other news. Not much. Not a peep out of DoL as far as
OHS matters is concerned. Are they treading water until new OHS
legislation is promulgated? Perhaps they are idly sitting around
awaiting rescue from the Mine Health and Safety Inspectors once the
two bodies, MHS Inspectorate and the weak Inspection & Enforcement
Service (I&ES), are merged. Will that happen in our lifetime?
Interesting enough Radio Highveld reported on 29 September 2005 that
'A report on oil giant Sasol is expect to be
released in February next year. The team selected by Labour Minister
Membathisi Mdladlana has started its probe into the company's health
and safety management system. This follows a series of explosions at
different plants in the last year some of them fatal. The Labour
department’s Page Boikanyo says the team has been given clear
guide-lines on what to investigate'. No other broadcaster
mentioned this and I wonder whether this refers to the
section 32 Formal
Inquiry that is under way or something different. If it is the latter
one wonders where they find the expertise to probe into Sasol's health
and safety management system? There is also nothing to this effect on
DoL's website.
I hope that those of you 'plug' into my website at
www.klasslooch.com have
seen that I routinely publish interesting OHS orientated court cases
on the home page. I change them usually every two weeks. The full text
of these cases is only available to Subscribers. And in this regard I
wish to welcome ACSA on board as a Subscriber.
The last two
court cases contained some interesting decisions.
In
City Council of Pretoria v De Jager
[1997] (A) the Supreme Court of Appeals ruled
that the (then) Pretoria City Council had taken adequate steps to
protect the public against an excavation while
in
Kruger v Carlton Paper of SA (Pty) Ltd
[2002] (A) the Supreme Court of Appeals ruled
that a warning sign posted outside a dangerous electrical installation
was sufficient and reasonable. (Subscribers can click on the cases
above for a full Law Report). I'm on a roll as I have quite a few more
interesting court cases up my sleeve. I have also started publishing
UK and Aussie OHS criminal convictions off their respective websites.
(The so-called ‘Sin Lists).
I will deal with these cases in detail at my
forthcoming swansong OHS Legislation Workshops. I also intend to focus
on OHS contracts with mandataries at these workshops and I will
demonstrate that, through contracts, you can manipulate and mould the
OHS Act to suit your own needs. It will relieve a lot of OHS stress
without even getting your fingers sticky!
|
Durban |
Protea
Edward Hotel, 149 Marine Parade |
22 November 2005 |
|
Port Elizabeth |
'The
'Oystercatcher'
Protea Marine Hotel Main Road |
23 November 2005 |
|
Cape Town |
de Waal
Holiday Inn Garden Court Mill Street
Gardens |
24 November 2005 |
|
Johannesburg |
'Tokyo
Room'
Barloworld Katherine Street
Sandton |
25 November 2005 |
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I apologise to
Subscribers if they receive this Newsletter twice as I am combining
your Special Newsletter with my OHS Chat & Skinner Newsletter. If you
get it twice just reach for the delete button.
Subscribers, I hope you enjoyed my last
Newsletter entitled
'The Prosecutorial Mind and Construction
Regulations'. Here is an
extract for you others.
'The principal contractor can be charged for any of the crimes
committed by the contractor and the client, in turn, for any of the
crimes of the principal contractor. In actual fact the client can be
charged for the crimes of either the principal contractor or the
contractor. This can be done in terms of section 37 for OHS Act for
statutory crimes only (OHS Act) and not for the common law crime of
culpable homicide. In the scenario above, the tenacious prosecutor
argues that there is sufficient linkage to an act or omission on the
part of the client and principal contractor to link them to the death
of the deceased. Had the principal contractor insisted upon and
approved a documented Risk Assessment and Fall Protection Plan, the
accident may not have occurred. The same argument could be used had
the client, in conjunction with the principal contractor, ensured the
Health and Safety Plans were implemented as envisaged by the
Construction Regulations'.
Hopefully see you all soon.
Regards
Raynard |