INYAKA BRIDGE COLLAPSE INSPECTOR

VKE Consulting Engineers (Pty) Ltd represented by Mr. A, the (1) contravened the following sections and regulations under the Occupational Health and Safety Act:

Section 10 (1) for failing to ensure the design of the Injaka Bridge was safe and complied with prescribed requirements. In that failure to ensure that the permanent works design of the bridge complied with the specification TMH7, the reference specification, regarding minimum reinforcement requirements;

failure to ensure that the application and interpretation of theTMH7 specification was entrusted to appropriately qualified and

experienced professional engineers;

failure to ensure independent checking of the design by appropriately qualified and experienced engineers in terms of the

TMH7 specification;

failure to ensure the integrity of the design concept by deviating from the contracted project specification with regards the location of the sliding path to a position not “under the webs”;

approving the suspension of automatic deflection monitoring devices at pier 2, over which the collapse occurred by persons not

appropriately qualified in incrementally launched bridges;

approval of a launching nose with stiffness values significantly less than that originally prescribed by the project specification; and failure to comply with the conditions of agreement regarding the inspection of the Works, by competent staff, to ensure the work is proceeding in accordance with the Contract documents and the integrity of the design concept is preserved by the Contractor, this includes the appreciation and analysis of identified cracks. None of the appointed personnel were considered appropriately qualified in incrementally launched bridges.

Concor Holdings (Pty) Limited represented by Mr. B the Chief Executive Officer in that the employer read with section 37 (1) contravened the following sections and regulations under the Occupational Health and Safety Act:

Section 10 (1) for failing to ensure the design of the Injaka Bridge was safe and complied with prescribed requirements. In that

failure to ensure the application and interpretation of the specification TMH7, regarding temporary works, was entrusted to

appropriately qualified and experienced professional engineers;

failure to ensure independent checking of the temporary works design by appropriately qualified and experienced engineers; and

failure to ensure the integrity of the design concept by deviating from the contracted project specification with regards the location of the sliding path to a position not “under the webs”;

Section 10 (2) for failing to ensure the erection/ construction of the Injaka bridge was safe and complied with prescribed requirements. In that -

failure to ensure compliance to the project specification, by the suspension of automatic deflection monitoring devices at pier 2, over which the collapse occurred, by persons not appropriately qualified in incrementally launched bridges;

failure to ensure that the east and west temporary bearing tolerances at pier 3 were within prescribed limits, paragraph B6803

of project specification.

Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) represented by Mr C, the Director General in that the employer read with section 37 (1) and37 (4) contravened the following sections and regulations under the Occupational Health and Safety Act:

Section 8 (2) (i) for failing to ensure that the design of both permanent and temporary works was under the supervision of persons trained to understand the hazards associated with it and to ensure that the precautionary measures prescribed are complied with. By the awarding of the design contract to VKE and the construction contract to Concor with both design staff not having appropriate qualifications and experience of incrementally launched bridges and without ensuring other reasonable steps were taken to ensure the designs were checked by appropriate competent engineers.

The definitions of “employee” and “employer” under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1993 are applicable to the relationship between DWAF and VKE and between DWAF and Concor.

Alternative charge:

Section 9 (1) for failing to conduct his undertaking in such a manner to ensure that persons other than those in his employment who may be directly affected by his activities are not thereby exposed to hazards to their health and safety. By the awarding of the design contract to VKE and the construction contract to Concor with both design staff not having appropriate qualifications and experience of incremental launching bridges and without ensuring other reasonable steps were taken to ensure the designs were checked by appropriate competent engineers.

Mr. D (in his personal capacity) in that he contravened the following sections and regulations under the Occupational Health and Safety Act:

Section 10 (1) failed to ensure that the permanent works design of the Injaka Bridge was safe and without risk to health when properly used and that it complied with all prescribed requirements.

For failing to ensure the compliance with the specification TMH7 in the following, namely –

a. failure to ensure minimum reinforcement requirements were met;

b. failure to ensure that the application and interpretation of the specification was entrusted to appropriately qualified and

experienced professional engineers; and

c. failure to ensure independent checking of the design by appropriately qualified and experienced engineers.

failure to ensure the integrity of the design concept by deviating from the contracted project specification with regards the location of the sliding path to a position not “under the webs”;

failure to comply with the conditions of agreement regarding the inspection of the works, by competent staff, to ensure the work is proceeding in accordance with the Contract documents and the integrity of the design concept is preserved by the Contractor, this includes failure to identify the incorrect position of the slide path in the design phase and during construction, and the appreciation and analysis of identified cracks.

Mr. E (in his personal capacity) in that he contravened the following sections and regulations under the Occupational Health and Safety Act:

Section 10 (1) for failing to ensure the temporary works design of the Injaka Bridge was safe and complied with prescribed requirements. In that –

failure to ensure the application and interpretation of the specification TMH7 was done by appropriately qualified and

experienced professional engineers;

failure to ensure independent checking of the temporary works design by appropriately qualified and experienced engineers; and failure to ensure the integrity of the design concept by deviating from the contracted project specification with regards the location of the sliding path to a position not “under the webs”;5.1.5.2.

Section 10 (2) for failing to ensure the erection/ construction of the Injaka bridge was safe and complied with prescribed requirements. In that -

Further, to any charges considered under common law (culpable homicide) against any party above consideration must be given to section 38 (2) of the Act with reference to the 19 injured persons in this incident. The extent of the catastrophic failure of the bridge equally could have caused the deaths of any of the 19 injured persons.

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